Yttrandefrihet existerar i Sverige som ett ideal, men i praktiken är det inte alltid så att den respekteras, utan det beror på. Det skriver Jordan Spencer Jacobs, gästdoktorand vid Centrum för teologi och religionsvetenskap i Lund, i årets sista sommarkrönika. Krönikan publiceras här i engelskt original.
I have come across an observation, or perhaps better said, a question, whose very existence has been cause for concern: do we have freedom of expression in Sweden today? In short, I do not know, and as I cannot confidently answer in the affirmative, a foreboding arises. But what, in more precise terms, is the observation that should warrant such a provocative query?
As one with a foothold within the Jewish community and the Academy, my own experiences reflect two fronts of a crisis not unique unto Sweden. For what I am referring to is a crisis in liberal democracy in which freedom of speech (and expression) is not synonymous with a respect for differences of opinion, nor for the civility that should accompany an exchange of contrasting views.
Accordingly, there is a corollary to this concerning trend: speech and expression are also interpreted in maximalist terms, and a moral paradigm emerges that decries limits on what may be said, or done, in our streets, avenues, and classrooms today. This paradigm, however, is slippery and contradictory at best, as the disdain for limits on speech is readily forgotten in the presence of those supporting the hostages in Gaza or Israel’s right to exist.
The Plight of the Jewish Community: A Case Study
The situation becomes more tangible if we focus upon the plight of the Jewish community in Malmö, and a recent article[1] captures a common experience: peaceful marches in support of the hostages still in Gaza are met with harassment, intimidation, heckling, and jeering. In our May 1st demonstration,[2] for instance, the Swedish police were obliged to form a circle of security vehicles around our group as a defensive response to growing numbers of those seeking to disrupt our proceedings. Granted, May 1st may not have been the best day to express open support for Israel. However, this should not matter if we live in a society in which freedom of speech is applied equally to all. As this experience suggests, it is not, for in practice, social mores permit some views while openly celebrating (or quietly allowing) the elimination of others.
It has now become acceptable, if not fashionable, to publicly bully and disparage those marching peacefully (and often silently) by yelling accusations that easily cross into the realm of antisemitism. In what other circumstances would we tolerate such rituals of humiliation towards an official minority group in Sweden? Few, if any, additional instances come to mind, and the fact that these behaviors are almost exclusively applied to Jews (and those professing support for Israel) suggests that challenging our right to freedom of speech and expression has effectively become normalized.
If we remain content in thinking that this is only a concern for the Jewish community we would be committing an error of monumental proportions, for what we allow to continue unabated in the public square (be it in Malmö, Stockholm, Boulder, Washington D.C., Madrid, Brussels, Paris, or Melbourne) ignites a form of societal acceptance for something more than speech. And it seems that the entity vested with the legal and moral authority to guarantee the rule of law and public safety (i.e. the State) appears, at times, to prefer a stance of “neutrality.”[3]
We may thus conclude that freedom of speech and expression exists as an ideal in Sweden, but in practice it is quite another story. In practice, it very much depends, and it is not always a universally enjoyed right by all.
On Speech and Expression in the University Today
Transitioning to the University, freedom of speech and expression is also understood by many in maximalist terms, and often under the guise of activism. No longer exclusively places of “higher education,” Universities are also increasingly contexts of political advocacy (and admittedly for particular agendas). Against the backdrop of this politicization is a reticence to roundly enforce pre-existing norms of civil decorum, and a tension emerges between conflicting moral suppositions that is left to fester in an unfruitful state of ambiguity.[4] How else are we to explain the preponderance of disruptions and sit-ins in which outside guests (be they students or members of the public[5]) knowingly and deliberately move their protests to inside a lecture hall or auditorium? While there is some pushback from university administrations there is also passive acceptance and partial inaction, and the result is that those who yell the loudest are rewriting the rules of the game.
Curiously, many of those manifesting opinions against the state of Israel argue that their own freedom of speech is under threat.[6] Freedom of speech and expression extends, in their estimation, to direct action (i.e. sit-ins, encampments, disruptions of campus activities, etc.). Any limitation, following this line of thought, is deemed a violation of academic freedom and an existential threat. And this is because such individuals operate under a divergent moral paradigm that idolizes protest, bucking the system, and political advocacy. Forcing the University to take an official position on political matters is, in this estimation, a natural extension of such a worldview.[7] Impartiality, simply put, is thereby read as an impediment to larger (and more radical) undertakings.
This rewriting of the rules of speech and expression in the Academy also occurs in more subtle ways. We may consider, for instance, events that utilize, as a point of departure, a concrete moral position often advertised as fact. To enter the chambers of such proceedings, one must hold certain priors, beliefs that are tantamount to a ticket of admission. All is well and good, we may surmise, until one asks for clarification concerning the meaning of such an event (and likely as a step towards formulating a proper question). Regrettably, such an inquiry will be taken as an outright dismissal and criticism of the organizers, and coincidentally, the only way to ask for such clarification is generally during the event itself. As such, who would dare to ruffle the feathers of colleagues in such an “antagonistic” way? Accordingly, how then may the University claim to be a context for innovation, creativity, and genuine diversity of thought if its proceedings are fashioned under moral absolutes which divide the world in black and white terms (i.e. Trump bad, immigration good, Israel evil, Netanyahu Hitler, and the far-right as the sole perpetrator of violence today?).[8]
Such views reflect what Bret Stephens has observed concerning the tragedy of thought diversity in the Academy today. Although an adherent to a gracious exchange of opinions, he nevertheless questions how it is now understood and practiced: instead of encouraging contrasting views to interact with one another (i.e., in the same room and space), they tend to exist in mutual isolation. Diverse views, in a literal and most minimal of ways, rarely exist within shared spaces, a trend in which an accommodation of distinct group preferences is privileged over any semblance of collective belonging.[9] If we accept Stephens’s analysis, intellectual isolation (or segregation) is afoot, and the task of working with those holding a different interpretation of reality is perhaps irremediably lost.
In the case of Zionism and the State of Israel in the Academy we have come to a point in which most mention of the terms that is not inherently negative is deemed a cultural faux paus, which by logical extension is another way of saying the following: that in many “shared” spaces today, Jews (given that most of us support the State of Israel in varying shades of grey, and not without our own criticisms of the government in power) are socio-cultural anomalies and living embodiments of a faux paus. What occurs is the exclusion of many Jewish voices in the University today,[10] and while some may cite the presence of Jewish academics and intellectuals generally opposed to Zionism, such as Avi Shalim, Peter Beinart, and Shaul Maggid, such a claim is not convincing. Anti-Zionism is not a majority-held opinion within the Jewish community, but rather, an outlier. And if you don’t believe me, consider the words of the prominent American Rabbi David Wolpe in reference to Harvard’s recent hiring of Maggid as Professor of Modern Jewish Studies: “Shaul Magid is a gracious human being and an estimable scholar of Jewish texts, notably Hasidism. I profoundly disagree with his stance on Israel and wish HDS [Harvard Divinity School] would appoint someone whose views reflect the mainstream of the Jewish community.”[11]
While it is possible to speak of Israel and Zionism in ways that are not excessively disparaging at the University, such instances do not generally occur in open settings, but rather in closed encounters in which those present constitute a friendly core. How can that constitute freedom of speech and expression? Regrettably, examples abound, and ironically, even from amongst those promoting Jewish ends.[12]
On the Value of Limits, as Enshrined in Law
In short, freedom of speech and expression should not exist in a vacuum wherein the only subject of moral value is the primogenitor of such views, or he or she screaming the loudest. What I hope I have communicated to the reader is a call not to eliminate, in one fell swoop, such views from our shared spaces today (i.e., the University and the public square), but rather to modify how such opinions may manifest themselves in practice. Correspondingly, and much to the chagrin of many, limits on expression and speech may indeed be warranted, as such freedoms require a moral responsibility to modify and/or temper our public expressions not to alienate or dehumanize those with whom we have to share our public spaces.[13] The tension in the University and without thus concerns the ever-expanding and runaway definitions of public speech and action. Permitting these formulations to continue unchecked may lead, inescapably, to further societal polarization and illiberalism, let alone additional instances of alienation, dehumanization, and exclusion of the Jewish Other.
But there is something else afoot that we cannot ignore: a convenient forgetting that some limits on speech are, in fact, enshrined in law. As a case in point, we may cite the Swedish Criminal Code, and specifically Chapter 16 (“On Offenses to Public Order”) Section 8:
A person who, in a statement or other communication that is disseminated, threatens or expresses contempt for a population group by allusion to race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religious belief, sexual orientation or transgender identity or expression is guilty of agitation against a population group and is sentenced to imprisonment for at most two years or, if the offence is minor, to a fine.
And it elaborates:
When assessing whether the offence is gross, particular consideration is given to whether the communication had particularly threatening or offensive content and was disseminated to a large number of people in a way that was liable to attract considerable attention. Act 2018:1744.[14]
Demonstrations against Israel today ascribe to such showings of “contempt” for a “population group” and undeniably seek to garner attention (especially via social media).[15] Such “contempt” also appears in spontaneous counterdemonstrations (often without permits) that humiliate, degrade, and shout down views expressed publicly by the Jewish community.
What can be done?
Concerning this newfound crisis of speech and expression in our public avenues and institutions of higher learning, what can or should be done? While the application of preexisting laws is an option, we seem far removed from witnessing it in practice today. Accordingly, I would like to suggest something else: a revitalization of civic education that would utilize the classroom experience as a laboratory for an exchange of civil and opposing views.
Fortunately, there is precedent concerning this “civic turn.” In his 2018 work Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Francis Fukuyama calls for an embrace of “creedal national identities” as a mean to assimilate (or integrate) individuals into a collective whole. He complements this by alluding to the value of “the teaching of basic civics” as well as service-related projects.[16] Ostensibly to counter the darker formulations of multiculturalism and identity politics, his suggestions offer a suitable platform for our own ideas: how, we may ask, do our institutions of higher learning promote civic education? Is the emphasis solely upon “global citizenship” at the exclusion of what it means to partake in a nation-building effort? [17] While a precise approximation is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, it nevertheless behooves us to ask if it is worth the time, energy, and funding to teach civil disagreement as a form of civic education in the classroom.
My own thinking is in the affirmative and gravitates towards the promise of paired textual study (or havruta in the Jewish tradition), a context in which two individuals critically analyze a short fragment of text together. I do believe such engagement offers a model for a civil exchange of views, and it is one that is taught (or rather learned) by doing. While some may claim that this form of study is well-removed from civic education, I would disagree, for what is practiced is civility, “a code” writes Jonathan Sacks, “for the gracious coexistence of difference.”[18]
Admittedly, such a proposition may not directly translate into how words and agendas appear in protests and public manifestations. But if offered to all students (i.e. undergraduate), the shared experience could possibly lay a foundation for how future exchanges may transpire in the classroom, and in other shared spaces. For what is envisioned is less about the content of a text and more about the form or means by which we approach words and ideas, and in turn, an Other who may not necessarily share our point of view.
At the end of the day, what is our alternative? If some suggest that civic education has no place in the university today (presumably for being too much a creation of the “nationalistic” right), I come as the bearer of bad news: such education is already alive and well in the many displays of activism and protest inside and outside its walls. To allow such maximalist expressions of speech and action to continue uninterrupted is to dismiss the moral responsibility to be civil towards the Other and to contribute to a collective whole that we have to share. We must continue to speak up and collaborate as educators and pedagogues in the spirit of our liberal democratic tradition before it is too late. In some ways, we have already crossed the Rubicon.
Jordan Spencer Jacobs
Visiting PhD student in Jewish Studies at Lund University
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Footnotes
[1] https://www.sydsvenskan.se/artikel/vi-kunde-genomfora-var-demonstration-tack-vare-polisens-beskydd/
[2] The demonstration had received official permission from the relevant Swedish authorities.
[3] This is not to belittle, however, the laudable efforts of many individual police officers who are placed in rather disagreeable circumstances as part of their professional duties.
[4] An example of this ambiguity from Lund University is evinced here: https://www.staff.lu.se/article/after-palestinagard-way-forward. While there is some movement in the right direction, a significant question mark remains concerning what must be done collectively, how, and precisely when.
[5] A case in point: a university conference I organized in 2023 in Spain was “interrupted” by Samidoun (i.e. the Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network), an organization officially designated by the United States, Canada, and the European Union as a “terrorist entity.” See: https://extremism.gwu.edu/what-samidoun and https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/O-10-2025-000014_EN.html
[6] There is more or less a global movement reflecting this position: https://palestinelegal.org/the-palestine-exception
[7] As an example of an effort seeking to push the University to take a political stance, see a letter from Lund Academics for Palestine to Vice Chancellor Erik Renström in January of 2024: https://www.luap.se/demands. Also see: https://uppsaladeclaration.se/ and https://israel-academia-monitor.com/2025/02/19/bds-activities-in-swedish-universities/.
[8] A nuance is warranted. This is not to say that we may categorize all in the Academy as ill-intentioned. What I am referring to here, instead, is a certain generalized predilection.
[9] https://sapirjournal.org/diversity/2025/viewpoint-diversity-up-to-a-point/
[10] For insight into how Jewish students are feeling in Swedish universities see:
https://www.sydsvenskan.se/2025-05-02/judiska-studenter-kanner-sig-inte-langre-trygga-i-lund/. For a visual example of this exclusion for and contempt of Jewish students at a Swedish University see: https://www.youtube.com/shorts/tsie_pOHdwo.
[11] https://x.com/RabbiWolpe/status/1930739166624743850
[12] A case in point is a network I participated in to combat antisemitism in Spain. Conceived by various academics, I found it curious that anti-Zionism was rarely a topic of conversation. While interest existed to combat dehumanization of Israel, most concerns were couched under “antisemitism.” I have noticed this trend in Sweden as well.
[13] For those weary of such limits, consider Karl Popper’s thinking on “the paradox of tolerance” or the “harm principle” of John Stuart Mill. Alternatively, and more recently, see The Harm in Hate Speech by Jeremy Waldron (2012).
[14] See: https://www.government.se/contentassets/7a2dcae0787e465e9a2431554b5eab03/the-swedish-criminal-code.pdf
[15] See: https://www.youtube.com/shorts/FCL3dezbOOc. The incident of concern occurs at 0:18 seconds.
[16] Identity, pp. 172-174, 2018.
[17] See: https://www.uu.se/en/department/education/research/curriculum-studies/civics-education-design-lab-cedel
[18] Jonathan Sacks, The Home We Build Together: Recreating Society, p. 185, 2007.